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Correspondence

Ease Over Accuracy
in Assessing Patent Settlements
A response to Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and
Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003).

Daniel A. Cranet
Settlement payments from patentee-plaintiffs to allegedly
infringing defendants in exchange for discontinuance of the allegedly infringing use have drawn much attention recently in
government and private antitrust litigation,' legal and economic scholarship,2 and Congress.3 I have argued that such "ret Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., Wheaton College. Thanks
to Jerry Hausman and Thomas Cotter for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304
(11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the district court's ruling that payments from the
patentee to the alleged infringer in consideration of the alleged infringer's
agreement not to market the allegedly infringing product during the pendency
of the lawsuit were per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 250-52
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the claim that "reverse payments" from the patentee to the alleged infringer are per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act); see also Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747 (2002) (collecting and discussing cases); Scott P. Perlman & Jay S.
Brown, FTC Targets Patent Settlement Agreements: Recent Actions Illustrate
Permissible and Unlawful Deals, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at C1 (summarizing recent government enforcement actions).
2. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Preliminary
Views: Patent Settlement Agreements, 16 ANTITRUST 53 (2002); Jeremy Bulow,
The Gaming of PharmaceuticalPatents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., forthcoming 2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "PresumptiveIllegality"Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); James
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verse payments" (also known as "exit payments" or "exclusion

payments") should not be accorded per se treatment under the
antitrust laws and should be approved so long as the patentee

has a strong ex ante likelihood of succeeding on the merits of
its infringement claim and thereby excluding the infringing use
from the market.4
In a recent article in the Minnesota Law Review's Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley argued that exclusion payments should be presumptively

unlawful, subject to an opportunity for the infringement plaintiff to rebut the presumption "by showing both (1) that the ex
ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than
the expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending
the lawsuit."5 The authors' proposed test is significantly more
restrictive than the test I have proposed: procedurally, it shifts

the burden of justifying the exit payment to the settling patentee, and substantively, it caps the permissible amount of the
exit payment at the patentee's expected future litigation costs.

Although the authors characterize their proposed test as
reflecting antitrust's post-Chicago revolution "preference for accuracy over ease,"6 I submit that it does the opposite by arbi-

Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded
to Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2003); Jonathan M.
Lave, Responding to Patent LitigationSettlements: Does the FTC Have It Right
Yet?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 201 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003); see also Crane, supra note 1, at 750
n.12 (noting the extensive commentary on antitrust issues in patent dispute
settlements).
3. Both houses of Congress have considered versions of the Drug Competition Act of 2003, which requires generic and branded pharmaceutical companies entering into settlements of patent infringement lawsuits to file a notification with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
within ten days of the settlement. See Drug Competition Act of 2003, S. 946,
108th Cong. §§ 1, 5, 6 (2003); Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement
Act of 2003 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate), H.R. 1, 108th
Cong. Title IX, §§ 901, 905, 906 (2003) (identifying Title IX as the House version of the Drug Competition Act of 2003); see also PromotingAvailability of
Lower Cost Generic Drugs:HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of the Honorable Timothy J. Muris, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission), at 2003 WL 21784991.
4. See Crane, supra note 1, at 779-82.
5. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
6. Id. at 1766.
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trarily capping the amount of settlement payments due to an
erroneous focus on the directional flow of plaintiff-to-defendant
settlement payments. As Thomas Cotter argued in his paper in
the same Symposium,7 the authors' test would exclude a range
of potentially socially desirable settlements and force patent infringement litigants into protracted, and socially costly, litigation.
I. WHY FIXATE ON THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW
OF THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENT?
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley consider payments from
patentee-plaintiffs to allegedly infringing defendants "inherently anticompetitive" because the amount the patentee is willing to pay is inversely correlated to the ex ante likelihood that
the patentee will prevail on its infringement claim if the case
goes to trial." Exactly the same could be said of the plaintiffs
incentives in any case involving a settlement providing for the
defendant's exit from the relevant market, whether or not cash
payment happens to flow from the plaintiff to the defendant. It
makes no sense to single out exclusion payments for disfavor
when the same potential for collusion arises in any settlement
involving the defendant's exit.
For example, if the period of past infringement substantially exceeds the expected future useful life of the patent, a
settlement may involve a payment from the defendant to the
plaintiff together with an agreement to discontinue the allegedly infringing use, even though the patentee's infringement
claim is relatively weak. The defendant's promise to exit the
market may not bring enough in present value monopoly profits to cover the patentee's expected damages recovery from the
period of past infringement, so the defendant has to make some
cash payment in addition to its exit promise to settle the lawsuit. 9 Similarly, the parties may agree to a "walk-away" settle7. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1802-15.
8. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
9. See Crane, supra note 1, at 775. For example, assume the defendant's
past period of infringement caused the patentee to lose $1000 in profits, the
defendant's exit from the market would bring the patentee $500 in future profits, and the patentee has a fifty percent chance of winning the case. Putting
aside any cost savings from settling, the patentee expects to gain $750 from
continuing its suit. The patentee will not accept a settlement in which the defendant merely agrees to discontinue the allegedly infringing use in the future. It will require a payment from the defendant of at least $250. The settlement will look "normal" (the defendant pays the plaintiff) even though a
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ment where the defendant discontinues the challenged use and
the patentee forgoes its claim for damages. 10 No money exchanges hands, but by forgoing the damages claim the patentee
has just as certainly bought out the possibility that it will not
prevail at trial as if it paid the defendant in cash.
Often, a case will involve both claims and counterclaims for
infringement of a series of different patents, or counts in addition to patent infringement. For example, if the plaintiff has a
patent infringement claim worth $1000 in future monopoly
profits, a breach of contract claim worth $2000 in past damages, and a fifty percent chance of prevailing on each claim, it
would be willing to settle the case for a payment from the defendant of $500 plus a stipulated injunction against future "infringement" of the patent. Settlement of such mixed cases not
involving the simple model of a patentee suing a defendant on a
single patent and paying the defendant to exit the market involves the same "evil" with which Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley are concerned: the exchange of consideration for the defendant's exit from the market without an adjudication that the
patent claim is good." The authors' test, however, would not
make such settlements presumptively illegal and subject to a
cap on the settlement payment amount because the patent
piece is embedded in a larger, aggregate settlement and the
cash payment flows from the defendant to the plaintiff as ordinarily happens in settlements involving only a claim for past
damages. 2
portion of the consideration is the monopoly profits the patentee will reap once
the defendant exits, just as in the sort of cases with which the authors are concerned.
10. For example, if the patentee has a damages claim with a present expected value of $1000 and its expected value from the defendant's exit from
the market is also $1000, the patentee would be willing to forgo its damages
claim in exchange for the defendant's exit from the market.
11. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1759.
12. The authors recognize that patent infringement settlements involving
a defendant's cessation of the challenged use without a "substantial exclusion
payment" may still raise concerns, but would allow such a settlement if a
"not... particularly searching" inquiry concluded the settlement was not a
"sham." Id. at 1760. If by "sham" the authors mean a settlement in which the
parties are aware that the patentee will not prevail at trial but purposefully
use the lawsuit as a cover for a market division agreement, then the category
of settlements not involving "exclusion payments" that the authors would find
problematic is very narrow. For example, a case in which the patentee thinks
it has a forty percent chance of winning at trial probably does not count as a
"sham," but the social costs of allowing the defendant to exit the market in
consideration of settling with the plaintiff (whatever the currency of settle-
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Where a settlement agreement involves a party's promise
to exit a market absent any adjudication that the party is legally required to exit, the currency of the settlement (cash
payment, forgoing a past claim for damages, forgoing a different legal claim, or some other agreement) is generally unimportant. The social cost of settlements involving the defendant's
exit from the market derives solely from the fact that the defendant might not have had to exit if it had won the patent
suit. If, ex ante, there is a ten percent chance that the defendant will prevail in the patent suit and the deadweight losses
caused by the absence of competition in the market would be
$1000, the cost of the defendant's exit is $100 (putting aside the
offsetting social benefits of settlements). The flow of the financial payments in the settlement does not cause that social cost
to increase or decrease. At most, the structure of the settlement
may provide some evidence of the parties' own valuation of the
strength of the lawsuit, although relying on directional flow to
determine ex ante predictions about the probable outcome of13
the lawsuit would be difficult or impossible in many cases.
Standing alone, the directional flow of the settlement payment
is a poor proxy for determining the ex ante likelihood that the
plaintiff would prevail at trial and legally exclude the defendant.
Settlements involving a cessation of some competitive activity by the defendant are not unique to patent litigation.
Similar issues could arise in litigation over covenants not to
compete, territorially limited franchises, trademarks, tortious
interference with contracts, or various kinds of unfair competition or misrepresentation claims. In many such cases, the litigants may have incentives to divide markets and split monopoly rents under the guise of settling a legal dispute, and these
incentives should be of concern to the courts and law enforcement agencies. But use of the direction in which settlement
payment flows to determine which settlements raise concern
will lead to an unduly high number of false positives and false
negatives.

ment) exceed the social gains of allowing the settlement.
13. See Crane, supra note 1, at 790.
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II. WHY CAP THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENT
AT THE PATENTEE'S EXPECTED
OUT-OF-POCKET LITIGATION COSTS?
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley would make per se illegal
any settlement payment from a patentee to an alleged infringer
that exceeded the "expected value of litigation and collateral
costs attending the lawsuit." 4 Their proposed rule is based on
the view that any settlement payment from a patentee to a defendant consists of two elements of value to the patentee: (1)
"the cost of continued litigation" and (2) "the value of eliminating competition that the patentee could not expect ex ante to
exclude after trial."" Since the elimination of competition element is illegitimate from an antitrust perspective, the authors
subtract it from the equation, thereby deriving the "cost of continued litigation" cap on the amount of any "exclusion payment." 16
The soundness of the authors' analysis of the economic
value of "exclusion payments" to patentees depends largely on
the definition of "cost of continued litigation."" Taking the
broadest definition, their observation might be substantially
true. But the authors take a narrow view of cost and would
limit their proposed cap to "out-of-pocket costs and attorney's
fees, 1 8 essentially the costs that are recoverable under ordinary
fee-shifting regimes.
This standard falls far short of accounting for the many
costs of litigation that firm managers consider in deciding
whether to settle. Fee-shifting statutes, which the authors' proposed rule essentially tracks in categorizing relevant costs, do
not permit recovery of all of the costs firms incur when they
litigate.'9 Patent managers understand that their costs of litigating far exceed their direct out-of-pocket expenses. 20 Firm
employees often spend as much time as their lawyers preparing
the case, producing documents, working with lawyers on litigation strategy, being deposed, traveling for lawsuit-related
14. Hovenkamp et al.,
supra note 2, at 1759.
15. Id. at 1758.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1760 n.177.
19. E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities
Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1439 (1994).
20. ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
PROFITING FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 17-18 (2000).
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events, testifying at trial, and observing legal proceedings. Litigation may require deposing or seeking documents from suppliers or customers or engaging in other public conduct that may
embarrass the litigants or damage relationships with third parties. 2' Broad discovery rules require the production of documents and sensitive competitive information for which protective orders fail to provide adequate assurance of
confidentiality.2 2 The length of patent litigation may itself impose costs on the patentee by making marketing, research and
development, and other business planning difficult while the
outcome of the case remains uncertain.
These and other indirect costs of continuing to litigate may
explain patentees' eagerness to settle infringement lawsuits for
payments to the defendants in excess of their expected out-ofpocket litigation costs, even when the patentees have a strong
ex ante likelihood of ultimately succeeding in the lawsuit.
Unlike direct litigation costs, these expected indirect costs are
probably too difficult to quantify to form the basis of the sort of
rule that Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose. That is not a
ground for excluding them from the calculus, but for not imposing a cost-based cap on the settlement amount at all.
In addition to these indirect costs of litigation, patentees
may choose to settle because of risk aversion,2 4 which itself
could be called a "cost" of continued litigation. Similarly, if the
firm's shares are publicly traded, the firm may have invested
considerable sums in research and development to obtain the
patent with assurances to shareholders of a profitable return
on the investment. An unexpected loss of the patent lawsuit
may cause management to lose credibility with shareholders
and lead to a greater decline in the value of the company's
shares than the lost net present value of future monopoly profits from winning the patent case.25 Settling allows management
21.

E.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 185

F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (D. Md. 2002) (noting that the defendant used the testimony of customers in attempting to show the invalidity of the patent due to
obviousness).
22. See Crane, supra note 1, at 758-59 (explaining that patent litigation
often requires sharing of sensitive competitive information in discovery and
that protective orders limiting access to such documents to attorneys involved
in the case are "difficult to enforce").
23. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (illustrating this problem).
24. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1806-07.
25. See, e.g., Lawrence Ingrassia, Polaroid Falls 22% on Negative News,
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to eliminate the possibility of unexpected bad news that might
have wider ripple effects for the firm.
In sum, patentees look to settle patent infringement lawsuits for a variety of reasons, including out-of-pocket litigation
costs, unrelated to "the value of eliminating competition that
26
the patentee could not expect ex ante to exclude after trial."
The authors' rule would disregard these costs and impose an
unduly restrictive cap on patent infringement settlements.
III. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF LIMITING PATENT
SETTLEMENTS AND THE LIMITED RELEVANCE
OF A LICENSING ALTERNATIVE
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley approach patent settlements involving exit or nonentry by the defendant from the
perspective of avoiding deadweight social losses that occur
when monopolists reduce output in order to increase price. If
ex ante there is a twenty percent chance that the patentee will
lose an infringement case in which victory would bring a deadweight loss of $1000 to society, the social cost of permitting a
settlement in which the defendant exits the market is $200from the antitrustperspective. But there is another side to the
story to which the authors devote few comments: the effects on
the incentive-reward system of the patent laws of curtailing
patentees' control over the process of legally vindicating their
patent rights. By severely limiting patent settlements, the authors' rule would undermine a major goal of patent law, that of
encouraging investment in innovation. 1
The potential social costs of the authors' rule are many.
Most obviously, if the rule results in prolonged litigation it will
impose on the patentee the costs identified in the previous section, which reduce the value of the patent and therefore the in-

WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1990, at C1 (reporting that Polaroid's stock price fell
twenty-two percent in reaction to a lower-than-expected damage award in its
patent infringement lawsuit against Kodak). Empirical research shows that
shareholders punish management more for unexpected bad news than they
reward management for unexpected good news. Werner F.M. De Bondt &
Richard H. Thaler, FurtherEvidence on Investor Overreactionand Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557, 557-58, 577-79 (1987); Werner F.M. De Bondt
& Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793, 799
(1985).
26. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1758.
27. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing this disincentive).
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centive to engage in inventive activity. Or the patentee may
be able to pass along the costs to its customers, who will then
bear the brunt of the settlement restriction. Prolonged litigation may also freeze inventive activity for years because of the
uncertainty over whether the alleged infringer will be allowed
to participate in the market with its current technology or will
be required to invent around the patent and to find an alternative, noninfringing way of entering. Because the expected damages award consists of the patentee's monopoly profits, in-

fringement defendants have an incentive to stay off the market
during the period of the lawsuit because their expected losses
from making sales exceed their expected gains (unless the patentee's case is very weak). 29 The defendant can only gain market share at a competitive price if it sells the allegedly infring-

ing product during the course of the litigation. An early
settlement eliminates the uncertainty over the scope and valid-

ity of the patent and may lead the defendant to invent around
the patent earlier than if it had awaited the outcome of the
patent lawsuit.0
The authors' rule would also have undesirable effects on
new firms' incentives to attempt entry. As Jerry Hausman has
shown, a rule restricting patent settlements will have the effect
of increasing the anticipated costs of litigation for any firm considering entering a patent-intensive market.3 ' Patent settle-

ments thus have the procompetitive effect of reducing barriers
to entry.32 Conversely, restricting patent settlements increases
barriers to entry by increasing litigation costs that are often
necessary for entry.3 3

28. Cotter, supra note 2, at 1809-10.
29. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241,
1247 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer
chose to delay marketing its drug until resolution of a branded firm's infringement lawsuit).
30. Crane, supra note 1, at 764.
31. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188, 256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting the expert declaration of Jerry Hausman
for the proposition that "'[tihe ability to settle a patent challenge on flexible
terms can have a pro-competitive effect because it increases the number of
patent challenges by decreasing barriers to entry.'").
32. Id.
33. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley call this argument "perverse" because
"inthe pharmaceutical industry the settlement in question, an exclusion payment, prevents entry altogether, not just by the settling firm, but by any other
generic as well" due to a loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., BalancingEase and Accuracy in Assessing PharmaceuticalExclu-
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Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley do not believe that their
proposed rule would "necessarily impede settlement[s]," because the parties can always agree to settle through a license
arrangement which enables "more competition while allowing
the parties to avoid the costs of uncertainty."3 4 Two brief responses are warranted.
First, a licensing agreement does not necessarily ensure
competition, and virtually ensures that the defendant's price to
customers will exceed the price it would have charged if it had
simply marketed the product without having to pay a royalty to
the patentee. A license may also give the patentee control over
the alleged infringer's price, quantity, or sales territory.35 As
Hovenkamp explains in his antitrust treatise, "firms cartelizing
a market may agree to use a licensing agreement to give effect
to a territorial division scheme, with the agreement covering a
patent of dubious validity."36 A settlement involving a licensing
agreement prior to any adjudication that the patent rights licensed are in fact enforceable poses many of the same risks of
monopolistic behavior by the licensor and licensee as "exclusion
payments." The defendant, who previously asserted that it had
the right to compete without permission of the patentee, now
agrees that it must pay the patentee for the right to compete
and to accept those conditions on its competitive behavior that
the patentee chooses to impose. Indeed, some settlements in
sion Payments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 712, 716-17 (2004). As I have noted elsewhere, the concerns created by the 180-day generic exclusivity rule to which
the authors are referring can be resolved by requiring the settling generic to
waive its statutory claim to exclusivity if it settles a patent infringement lawsuit. See Crane, supra note 1, at 795-96.
34. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1760-61.
35. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.5cl (2d ed. 1999).
36. Id. § 5.5c2.
37. The authors' assertion that "licensing is generally a procompetitive
practice," Hovenkamp et al., supra note 33, at 717, may be overbroad as applied to licensing agreements in the settlement of patent lawsuits. Courts and
the antitrust enforcement agencies generally favor licensing of intellectual
property because they assume that the licensee would have been unable to use
the intellectual property absent the license. When the licensee and licensor
would have been competitors absent the licensing arrangement, antitrust concerns arise. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.1, 7 (1995)
(stating that "antitrust concerns may arise when a licensing arrangement
harms competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license (entities in a
'horizontal relationship')"). In a patent infringement lawsuit between branded
and generic pharmaceuticals, the generic is claiming that it is entitled to be
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which the defendant accepts a payment from the plaintiff to
discontinue the allegedly infringing use may be preferable to
licensing settlements because the defendant may thereafter invent around the patent and enter the market in unfettered
competition with the patentee, but without infringing the patent.38
Second, firms may be reluctant to license their patents because the licensee may free ride on the patentee's promotional
efforts or dilute the value of the patent through poor production
or marketing of the patented product.39 Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley acknowledge this limitation on the licensing option (although they believe it to be rare), but dismiss it as an argument
for permitting exclusion payments because the patentee is free
to not settle at all.4" That observation, however, only questions
whether we are better off with a blanket rule against exclusion
payments that exceed expected out-of-pocket litigation costs or
with a rule that acknowledges that these settlements may be
socially optimal when the patentee has a strong chance of succeeding in its patent infringement claim. If settlements involving a defendant's cessation of the allegedly infringing use in exchange for a payment from the patentee exceeding the
patentee's expected out-of-pocket litigation expenses are sometimes socially preferable to continued litigation, the hypothetical possibility of an alternative licensing solution does not support adoption of the authors' per se rule.

the branded firm's competitor without a license. When the generic drops that
assertion and accepts a license prior to adjudication of its defense, the same
concerns arise as when the generic agrees to exit the market as part of a settlement.
It is not difficult to imagine how a patentee with a weak infringement
claim could assure the continuity of its monopoly profits by settling through a
licensing arrangement. For example, the patentee could assign the licensee an
exclusive sales territory and collect a royalty even while it continued to collect
monopoly rents in its own sales territory. In the licensing context, just as in
the "exclusion payments" context, the ex ante strength of the infringement
claim, not the form of the settlement, should drive the antitrust assessment.
38. See Crane, supra note 1, at 768-69. The settling patentee may try to
prevent the defendant from inventing around the patent by broadening the
scope of the settlement agreement to include activities not covered by the patent's claims. Id. at 769. However, Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, and I agree that
any such overbroad settlement would be illegal. Compare Hovenkamp et al.,
supra note 2, at 1764-65, with Crane, supra note 1, at 792-96.
39. Crane, supra note 1, at 767-68.
40. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 2, at 1761 n.180.
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IV. WHOSE BURDEN IS IT?
While my principal objection to Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley's proposed rule relates to their proposed cap on "exclusion settlement" payments, I also differ with their view that all
payments from a patentee to an alleged infringer should be
presumptively illegal, subject to the defendant's right to rebut
the presumption of illegality under defined circumstances.4'
While it may be sensible to require the settling parties to
document the strength of the patentee's infringement claim,
placing the burden of persuasion on the settling parties would
unduly chill patent infringement settlements.
On a practical level, the allocation of the burden of production may be relatively unimportant. The determining factor in
whether to approve or to disapprove patent settlements involving the defendant's exit or nonentry should be the ex ante likelihood that the defendant would be excluded from the market if
the case was finally adjudicated. The settling parties typically
will have the most information on that topic and will, therefore,
be in the best position to produce information justifying the settlement. 2 Wherever the burden is technically placed, the settling parties' own information usually will become the fulcrum
of the antitrust analysis, and there is relatively little social cost
in requiring the settling parties to retain documents going to
the core issues in the patent infringement lawsuit. Placing the
burden of persuasion on the settling parties, however, would
chill patent infringement settlements by making them presumptively illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.43 One
does not envy the patentee's general counsel who has to inform
senior management that by settling a patent infringement lawsuit they will presumptively become criminals and subject to
fines and imprisonment unless they can persuade a jury that
they likely would have won the patent infringement lawsuit
anyway. Such a rule would also encourage unfounded treble
damages lawsuits against the settling parties, since consumers
could sue simply by alleging that a settlement involving an exclusion payment occurred, regardless of the strength of the patentee's infringement suit. From the perspective of the outside
41. Id. at 1759.
42. See generally Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in
Civil Litigation:An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997)
("Other things being equal, the lower one party's relative costs, the stronger

the argument for giving him the burden of proof.").
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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observer, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's proposed rule sends
the message that patent settlements involving exit payments
are inherently suspect, even though many such settlements are
socially desirable.
Pending legislation may partially rationalize the burden
question in the pharmaceutical industry, the locus of the recent
controversy over patent settlements. The Drug Competition
Act 44 will require the settling parties to notify the antitrust enforcement agencies of most patent infringement settlements
within ten days, giving the agencies an opportunity to investigate and to shape the settlements through injunctive litigation
(or the threat of litigation). As a practical matter, government
involvement in pharmaceutical patent settlements may come to
resemble Hart-Scott-Rodino merger review,4 5 where the burden
of proving the merger anticompetitive lies with the government
but practically shifts to the merging parties seeking to avoid
46
the cost, embarrassment, and delay of a government lawsuit.
Requiring the settling parties to justify their settlement in discussions with the government at the time of the settlement is
reasonable, but presumptively exposing them to criminal liability and treble damages suits is not.
CONCLUSION
Crafting a simple legal rule makes sense when its application is likely to reach the optimal result most of the time and
the costs of applying a more complicated rule would exceed its
benefits. The per se rule proposed by Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley meets the test of simplicity, but not the test of general
accuracy. By focusing the attention of courts and antitrust
regulators on the direction in which settlement payments flow,
the per se rule diverts attention from the fact that the strength
of the patent infringement suit, not the monetary structure of
the settlement, determines whether the settlement is socially
44. See supra note 3 (discussing the Drug Competition Act of 2003).

45. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000).
46. The Drug Competition Act does not give the government one of its
most powerful tools under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: the ability to hold up the
merger pending satisfaction of a Second Request. See Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1292-93 (1999) (discussing the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act's influence over the application of antitrust law to corporate mergers).
47.

See generally Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX

WORLD (1995) (proposing a return to simple rules in different substantive areas of law).
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beneficial or costly. By capping patent settlements involving a
plaintiff-to-defendant payment at the plaintiffs expected outof-pocket legal expenses, the rule would make per se illegal
many socially beneficial settlements. If a court or antitrust enforcement agency concludes that the patentee's claim is likely
to succeed, then placing restrictions on the direction in which
payment can flow in the settlement or capping the amount of
the settlement at the patentee's expected out-of-pocket litigation expenses is unwarranted.

